Deleuze Cinema 2

P27

Does he not mean that the movement-image (the shot) consists of a first articulation in relation to a change or becoming which the movement expresses, but also a second articulation in relation to the objects between which it is established, which have become at the same time integral parts of the image (cinemes)?

movement-image has become a reality which ‘speaks’ through its objects.

language system of reality is not at all a language.

P28

but ‘semiotics’, as the system of images and sign independent of language in general.

Narration is grounded in the image itself, but it is not give.

P29

If we ask what the function of the sign makes its object know; on the contrary, it presupposes knowledge of the object in another sign, but adds new elements of knowledge to it as a function of the interpretant.

P35

The movement-image does not reproduce a world but constitutes an autonomous world, make up of break and disproportion, deprived of all its centre of his own perception.

It is a homage to psychoanalysis, which has only even given cinema one sole object, one single refrain, the so-called primitive scene.

P43

Conversely, the pure optical image may be only a description, and concern a character who no longer knows how or is no longer able to react to the situation; the restraint of this image, the thinness of what it retains, line or simple point…

sensory-motor image was useful because it linked a perception image to an action image; it already modelled the first on the second and extended the one into the other.

P44

Perhaps we should also image other possible answers, more or less related, more or less distinc: what would enter into relation would be the real and the imaginary, the physical and the mental, the objective and the subjective, description and nrration, the actual and the virtual . . .

P45

The purely optical and sound situation (description) is an actual image, but one which instead of extending into movement, links up with a virtual image and forma s circuit with it.

subjectivity already emerged in the movement-image; it appears as soon as there is a gap between a received and executed movement, an action and reaction, a simulation and a response, a perception-image and an action image.

P60

Colour is dream, not because the dream is in colour, but because colours in Minneli are given a highly absorbent, almost devouring, value.

P77

The present is the actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the virtual image, the image in a mirror.

The virtual image (pure recollection) is not a psychcological state or a consciousness: it exists outside of consciousness, in time, and we should have no more difficulty in admitting the virtual insistence of pure recollections in time than we do for the actual existence of non-perceived objects in space.

P96

What the past is to time, sense is to language and idea to thought.

P122

regimes of the image

p143

We may, then, consider the story as the development of two kinds of images, objective and subjective, their complex relation in an identity of the type Ego=Ego; identity of the character seen and who sees the character and is what the charater sees.

P147

The character is continually becoming another, and is no longer separable from this becoming which merges with a people.

P156

Metaphor is sometimes extrinsic, sometimes intrinsic.

What Einstein called ‘the new sphere of filmic rhetoric, the possibility of bearing an abstract social judgement’.

The whole is constantly open (the spiral), but so that it can internalize the sequence of images, as well as becoming externalized in this sequence.

SOUND

P225

We are sometimes reminded that there is not just one soundtrack, but at least three groups, words, noises, music.

p231

In fact, all the sound elements, including music, including silence, form a continuum as something which belongs to the visual image.

music interacts as a foreign body.